This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.
Introduction
During the first 18 months of the Euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders in its main refinancing operations to allocate liquidity to the banking sector. In a fixed rate tender, the interest rate is pre-announced by the central bank, and banks simply indicate how much refinancing they would like to receive at that rate. When total bids exceed the intended allotment, banks are rationed proportionally to their bids according to a uniform allotment ratio.
The fixed rate tender procedure was abandoned by the ECB in June 2000 due to an escalating overbidding problem. Banks increasingly exaggerated their demand for reserves until finally banks bid on average more than 100 times their actual demand. The overbidding severely hampered the ECB's liquidity management and it was also costly and risky for banks (see e.g. Bindseil, 2004 and Oechssler, 2003) . The reasons for the observed overbidding are still under dispute. Thus, in this paper we try to assess the empirical relevance of various proposed explanations for the overbidding phenomenon. For this purpose, we use data from the ECB's fixed rate tenders as well as data from the Bundesbank which employed fixed rate tenders from 1996 to 1998.
In June 2000, the ECB switched to a variable rate tender format, a standard multi-unit auction augmented by a minimum bid rate. Using variable rate tenders entails a partial loss of control of the central bank over short term interest rates which explains why the ECB has still a marked preference for the fixed rate tender format, see e.g. ECB (2000, p.37) . Moreover, recent modifications of the ECB's operational framework are apparently designed to allow a return of the fixed rate tender format. Therefore, the question of what contributed to banks' overbidding in fixed rate tenders is still an important one.
Three theoretical explanations for the overbidding problem have been discussed in the literature. The first explanation, 'the rate hike hypothesis', is advanced by the ECB itself and states that overbidding was solely caused by interest rate hike expectations, see ECB (2000) and Bindseil (2004) . Clearly, if banks expect increasing repo rates within the reserve maintenance period, bidding in the current repo auction is particularly attractive and leads banks to exaggerate their demand. 1 According to the ECB, there is nothing wrong with fixed rate tenders in times when interest rates are expected to remain constant. In the ECB's recently announced 'measures to improve the efficiency of the operational framework', the role of interest rate expectations for banks' bidding is mitigated by the commitment that rate changes will not occur during a maintenance period, see ECB (2003, p78) . 2 According to the rate hike hypothesis, the implementation of these measures allows the return to the fixed rate tender format since both, the under-and the overbidding problem should be completely solved.
There is clear evidence, partly based on individual bidding data, that interest rate expectations are an important determinant of banks' bidding behavior, see Breitung and Nautz (2001) . Yet, interest rate hike expectations did not prevail for the entire period in which fixed rate tenders were employed. In particular, the Bundesbank observed overbidding in its fixed rate tenders from 1996 until 1998 when interest rates remained more or less constant. 3 This already indicates that rate hike expectations might not be the whole story. In this case, the ECB's new operational framework mitigates but cannot solve the overbidding problem inherent to the fixed rate tender format.
The second explanation, the 'tight liquidity hypothesis', is due to Ayuso and Repullo (2003) . They argue that the ECB kept liquidity too tight such that the resulting spread between the interbank rate and the repo rate was too large. Risk neutral banks therefore overbid in order to profit by arbitrage from this interest rate differential. In fact, during the fixed rate tender period the average spread was about 8 basis points which might be well above the so-called natural spread stirred by different collateral requirements. Following the tight liquidity hypothesis, avoiding rate hike expectations is not sufficient for preventing banks from overbidding. A further necessary con-1 Analogously, when interest rates are expected to decrease, banks underbid, i.e. they tend to refrain from bidding. Since bids have been constraint by a minimum bid rate, underbidding also occurred in the ECB's variable rate tenders, see Bindseil (2004) and Linzert et al. (2003) .
2 The new measures can be summarized as follows: Starting in 2004, the maintenance period will be defined by the meetings of the Governing councils. Rate changes will only occur at those meetings. Moreover, the maturity of repos will be shortened from two to one week. As a result, rate changes will not occur anymore during the maintenance period. The implications of these measures for the allotment policy of the ECB are analyzed by Ewerhart et al. (2003) .
3 See Bindseil (2004) for a comprehensive review on the overbidding experience of other central banks.
dition for banks to bid seriously is a 'neutral' liquidity management by the ECB which guarantees that the spread is on average at its natural level.
Finally, the third explanation may be entitled the 'rationing hypothesis'. It claims that there can be overbidding in fixed rate tenders even if rates are not expected to increase and even if the the repo rate on average equals the interbank rate. Based on the model in Nautz and Oechssler (2003) , Ehrhart (2000 Ehrhart ( ,2001 shows that overbidding can occur even if there is only a probability that banks are rationed and do not receive their full demand. 4 The 'rationing hypothesis' is complemented by an adaptive learning process (Nautz and Oechssler, 2003) that explains why banks increasingly overbid. Understanding the dynamics of overbidding is of particular importance because the main problem of the fixed rate tender procedure was not constant overbidding but increasing overbidding which resulted in an explosion of bids.
In order to evaluate the empirical relevance of these hypotheses, we investigate the determinants of total bids and allotments in the fixed rate tenders of the ECB and the Bundesbank. Our main finding is that none of the three theories alone can explain the empirical performance of the fixed rate tenders. To account for rate hike expectations, we include the spread between the one month interest rate and the biweekly repo rate. Following Ayuso and Repullo (2001) we also include the difference between the overnight rate and the repo rate to test the 'tight liquidity hypothesis'. Both interest rate spreads were found to be important for banks' bidding behavior. However, if funds are perfect substitutes within the reserve maintenance period, banks should arbitrage away any expected differences between current and future cost of funds, see Hamilton (1996) . As a consequence, current overnight rates do not only reflect prevailing liquidity conditions but also rate expectations. We therefore propose two alternative liquidity measures, namely, the aggregate reserve surplus of the banking sector and the recourse to the ECB's marginal lending facility. Both measures have no significant influence on bids, which questions the tight liquidity hypothesis.
While rate expectations and -to a lesser extent -tight liquidity condi-tions prove to be important, other factors still matter. In particular, we find that a linear time trend is significant, which is compatible with an adaptive learning process. This suggests a more fundamental problem with fixed rate tenders that cannot be alleviated by the proposed measures of the ECB (2003) since they aim only to exclude rate hike expectations as source of the overbidding.
The closest reference to our paper is Ayuso and Repullo (2001) who restrict attention to the rate hike and the tight-liquidity hypotheses. They estimate bid functions for the fixed rate tenders of the ECB and find support only for the latter (under the assumption that the spread between the overnight rate and the repo rate adequately describes tight liquidity). The current paper investigates the empirical relevance of all three competing explanations for the overbidding phenomenon and uses auction data from both, the Bundesbank and the ECB. Moreover, advancing on previous studies on banks' bidding behavior, our analysis explicitly accounts for the interplay between bidders and the central bank's allotment policy by estimating a system including both, bids and allotments as endogenous variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the overbidding experience of the Bundesbank and the ECB and introduce the explaining variables used in our regressions. In Section 3 we present the empirical results for the Bundesbank's and the ECB's auction data. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.
The overbidding phenomenon
In a fixed rate tender the central bank sets the repo rate, and banks simply bid the amount of refinancing they wish to obtain at that rate. Having collected all bids, the central bank decides upon the repo volume, i.e. the total allotment A, and each bank gets the same quota (allotment ratio) Q = min(1, A/B) of its bid, where B is the sum of all bids. Figure 1 shows the allotment ratios of the weekly fixed rate tenders performed by the Bundesbank (since February 1996) and the ECB (until June 2000) . Note that the German experience with overbidding should be helpful for the ECB, simply because a major part of the repo volume is usually allocated to German banks, compare Breitung and Nautz (2001) . On average, the Bundesbank allotted only 30% of the bids; in the Eurosystem the av- erage allotment ratio (6.1%) was even lower. What is particular noticeable is the dramatic decline of the allotment ratio over time. The ratio started 1996 above 40%, declined to about 15% at the end of 1998 and reached in May 2000 an all-time low of 0.87%. Figure 2 reveals that the downward trend in the ratio is solely due to increasing bids and not to more restrictive allotments. Obviously banks tried to circumvent the rationing of the central bank by increasingly exaggerating their bids. Every theory that deals with fixed rate tenders must be able to explain this feature.
In the following, we will investigate the three competing explanations for the overbidding phenomenon using auction data from both, the Bundesbank and the ECB. In contrast to Ayuso and Repullo (2001) and Breitung and Nautz (2001) , our analysis of banks' bidding explicitly accounts for the interplay between the bidders and the allotment policy of the central bank.
To that aim, we estimate a system having both, total bids and total allotments as endogenous variables. Before we present the results, we introduce the explanatory variables and discuss their predicted influence.
Rate change expectations are an important factor to understand banks' bidding behavior and a variable capturing interest rate expectations has to be included in any analysis of bidder behavior in repo auctions. For example, both peaks in Figure 1 (August 21, 1996 and April 7, 1999) are due to banks' underbidding, i.e. banks anticipated upcoming interest rate cuts and thus refrained from bidding. In line with the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, we use the term spread (m − r) between the one month interest rate, m, and the biweekly repo rate, r, as a proxy for the prevailing interest rate expectations. Thus, negative values of m − r indicate that the repo rate is expected to decrease while large positive values point to rate hike expectations. Note, however, that the increase of the one-month rate in December 1999 is solely due to the Y2K-effect and does not reflect rate change expectations, compare Figure 3 . In line with Gaspar et al. (2001) , Figure 3 illustrates that the repo rate changes of the Bundesbank and the ECB typically had been anticipated by the market. According to the 'rate hike hypothesis' advanced by the ECB, rate hike expectations are the only relevant explanation for banks' overbidding and the failure of the fixed rate tender format. Following the 'tight liquidity hypothesis' of Repullo (2001, 2003) , rate hike expectations are only part of the overbidding story. According to their model, the spread between the interbank overnight rate and the repo rate (i − r) is the predominant factor for banks' bidding behavior. Thus, we include this spread as well in the regressions. However, as a referee pointed out, it is not clear how to separate liquidity and expectations effects when the overnight rate follows a martingale, see Hamilton (1996) . We will therefore perform additional regressions where (i − r) is replaced by two alternative liquidity measures, namely, the aggregate reserve surplus and the recourse to the ECB's marginal lending facility.
The rationing hypothesis in combination with the adaptive learning process of Nautz and Oechssler (2003) implies that past bids and allotments matter for the bidding behavior of banks. A simplified version of this process works as follows. Banks with true demand for reserves D j are supposed to assume myopically that the allotment quota remains unchanged from the previous period. As a best reply to the anticipated rationing, bank j bids 1/Q t−1 times its true demand, B j t = D j /Q t−1 . Summing over all banks yields
This difference equation explodes if the sum of true demands for reserves exceeds the allotment of the central bank (by however small amount). In other words, the rationing hypothesis implies that total bids B t increase exponentially. If the bid equation is written in logs, this should be reflected in an additional linear time trend.
Empirical results
The empirical analysis of the overbidding phenomenon is based on the following model describing the determinants of banks' bidding and the central bank's allotment policy. The endogenous variables are the log of total bids submitted in a fixed rate tender b t and the log of the central bank's total allotment a t where t = 1, 2, 3, . . . refers to the weekly fixed rate tenders.
The allotment equation contains contemporaneous total bids as an explaining variable because the bids are known to the central bank when the allotment is determined. The system will therefore be estimated by three-stage least squares (TSLS) for both samples (Bundesbank and ECB). 5
The equations of the system contain lags up to order two. Higher lag orders turn out not to be significant, presumably because the maintenance period of required reserves is one month. Recall that i − r [m − r] denotes the spread between the overnight rate i [the one-month rate m] valid at the bidding day of the fixed rate tender and the repo rate r. In a first step of our analysis, we follow Ayuso and Repullo (2001) and assume that these variables account for the impact of opportunity cost and rate expectations for banks bidding predicted by the 'tight liquidity' and the 'rate hike hypothesis', respectively. In the next section, we will check the robustness of our results by introducing two alternative liquidity measures.
The 'rationing hypothesis', which predicts that exploding bids are inherent to the fixed rate tender format, implies a significant linear time trend t in the bid equation (see equation (1)). To allow for possible liquidity effects, we include the (lagged) change of the repo rate ∆r into the set of explaining variables. Furthermore, to account for possible "squeezing" effects (see Footnote 4) as suggested by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) we include a dummy variable, end t , that indicates the last tender of a reserve period.
Finally, x is a vector of further variables which captures specific features of the Bundesbank's and the ECB's data. Under normal circumstances, total allotments of the Bundesbank and the ECB increased slightly over time due to monetary expansion. However, in May 1998 the Bundesbank transferred its profit to the German government and sterilized the resulting increase in reserves by reducing the available repo volume, see Figure 2 . For the Bundesbank data, x therefore consists of the step-dummy prof it which is one after 5/13/1998 and zero otherwise. For the ECB, the variables in x account for the Year 2000 (Y2K) effect. In particular, the increase of the one-month rate in December 1999 is due to Y2K and does not reflect rate change expectations, see Figure 3 . x therefore consists of the dummy variable Y 2K which is one in December 1999 and zero otherwise. Following Ayuso and Repullo (2001) and Breitung and Nautz (2001) , we avoid the distorting effect of Y 2K on the variable measuring the rate expectations by including (1 − Y 2K)(m − r), not m − r, into the regressions.
The Bundesbank employed fixed rate tenders in its main refinancing operations from February 1996 until the end of 1998, which gives us 150 observations. The ECB conducted fixed rate tenders from 1999 until June 2000 which gives us 74 observations. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Let us first look at the equations explaining the central bank's supply of repos. The general impression is that the allotment policies of the Bundesbank and the ECB appear to be very similar. For both central banks, the current allotment strongly depends on the allotments one and two weeks ago, but with contrary signs. This indicates that repos were used on a revolving basis, i.e. banks repay maturing repos using new repo credit. In contrast, neither lagged nor current bids have a significant influence on the central banks' allotment. Apparently, submitted bids contained no valuable information for the Bundesbank's and the ECB's liquidity management. The central banks' supply of repo credit is also unaffected by repo rate changes (∆r). However, there are notable differences between the Bundesbank and the ECB concerning the impact of rate expectations (m − r) and (to a lesser extent) tight liquidity (i − r) which are significant for the Bundesbank but not for the ECB. In this sense, the Bundesbank had been more active in its allotment policy than the ECB, compare Ejerskov et al. (2003) . The estimated coefficients reveal that the Bundesbank supplied reserves more generously whenever liquidity conditions were tight and the term spread indicated that interest rates are expected to increase.
We now turn to the equations explaining the bidding behavior of banks. The estimated bid functions for the repo auctions of the ECB show that rate expectations have a strong influence on banks' bidding. The coefficient of the term spread (m − r) is highly significant and plausibly signed, i.e. total bids increase in times of rate hike expectations. The importance of rate and r denote the one-month, overnight and the repo rate, resp. prof it is a step-dummy accounting for the transfer of Bundesbank profits to the Government, Y 2K is one in december 1999 and zero otherwise. end equals one if the tender is the last in the reserve period and is zero otherwise.
The systems are estimated by TSLS using two lags of all predetermined variables as instruments.
expectations for banks' bidding is also reflected in the significant impact of ∆r. Compared with the results obtained for the ECB, the impact of rate expectations on banks' bidding is rather weak in the Bundesbank auctions (the coefficient for (m − r) is much smaller than that for the ECB but marginally significant at the 5% level). This weak effect might be due to the specific sample period where rate expectations did not play an important role. In fact, from 1996 to 1998 bids steadily increased but the German repo rate remained more or less constant. The significant influence of rate expectations on banks' bidding behavior is in contrast to earlier findings by Ayuso and Repullo (2001 , Table 5 ). They estimated a bid function for the ECB's fixed rate tenders of the following form.
Note that this specification neglects the significant influence of ∆r t and the linear time trend. 6 Moreover, it severely restricts the dynamic structure of the bidding process. Compared with the more general bid equation (2), equation (4) assumes that α 1 = β 1 = 0 as well as β 2 = −α 2 = 1. These parameter restrictions can be tested and are strongly rejected by the data. The results presented in Table 1 may also be seen as supporting the tightliquidity hypothesis. In accordance with Ayuso and Repullo (2001) , the highly significant coefficient of the spread i −r in the bid equations indicates that banks compare the repo rate with the cost of alternative refinancing opportunities before they submit the bids. As expected, the larger the spread, the larger the submitted bid volume. Finally, note that end-ofperiod effects seem to be not of particular importance. The end-of-period dummy is not significant for the ECB while the effect is significant but only small in the Bundesbank auctions. It is worth emphasizing that none of the above hypotheses, either on its own or combined, is sufficient to explain why banks overbid. In particular, the highly significant time trend in both bid functions demonstrates that the upward trend in the log of total bids is not only due to interest rate effects. In line with the rationing hypothesis, total bids increase over time independent of prevailing rate expectations and the allotment policy of the central bank. The estimated long-term trends [τ (1−β 1 −β 2 )] imply a weekly increase in the bids of about 2% for the ECB and 0.8% for the Bundesbank auctions. Note that bids in the Bundesbank auctions may have increased less dramatically because in the Bundesbank auctions the complete bid, not only the allotment, had to be collateralized by the bidders.
The results indicate that past allotments have a negative effect on bids, which shows that banks increased their bids if the allotment in the preceding repo auction was low. In fact, the estimated coefficients of lagged allotments and bids suggest an intuitive response of bidders to observed auction outcomes, which is in line with the adaptive process (1). For both central banks, the parameter restrictions α 1 = −β 1 and α 2 = −β 2 are not rejected by the data: the p-values of the corresponding Wald tests are 0.114 for the Bundesbank and 0.805 for the ECB. Thus, banks increased their bids excessively because past allotment ratios were low. Due to this overbidding, the allotment ratio of the next auction was even lower which in turn reinforced banks' overbidding.
Alternative measures of tight liquidity
Up to now we followed Ayuso and Repullo (2001) by testing for the tight liquidity hypothesis solely through its effect on the spread (i − r) between the overnight rate i and the repo rate r. However, measuring the liquidity by that interest rate spread ignores that the current overnight rate is also influenced by prevailing rate expectations such that it becomes difficult to disentangle the rate hike and the tight liquidity hypotheses. To see this, recall that both, the ECB and the Bundesbank allowed banks to average their reserve holdings over the monthly reserve maintenance period. As a result, funds should be perfect substitutes within the reserve period and risk neutral banks should arbitrage away any expected differences between the current and future overnight rate. 7 In the following, we shall therefore re-estimate equations (2) and (3) but replace (i − r) through two alternative measures of liquidity. Since daily data for those measures are not available for the Bundesbank period, we concentrate on the bid and allotment equations of the ECB. Measuring the tightness of liquidity conditions in the interbank market is not an easy task. Our first candidate is the variable reserve surplus that relates banks' reserve holdings accumulated over the current maintenance period to their reserve requirements. The smaller the reserve surplus at the bidding day of the auction, the tighter is liquidity in the interbank market. Thus, if liquidity conditions fostered overbidding, a higher reserve surplus should significantly decrease banks' bids.
The second liquidity measure, marginal lending, refers to banks' aggregate recourse to the ECB's marginal lending facility. The marginal lending facility provides overnight liquidity to the banking sector and serves as an emergency credit for European banks. The volume of marginal lending should increase when liquidity conditions become tighter. Accordingly, the tight liquidity hypothesis would predict that marginal lending significantly increases the bids. Note, however, that marginal lending is based on "individual" liquidity problems which might only loosely connected with aggregate liquidity conditions. Table 2 shows the results obtained for the alternative liquidity measures. With respect to the supply of repos, the ECB's response to aggregate liquidity conditions measured by reserve surplus is highly significant and plausibly signed. In particular, the ECB provides less liquidity if accumulated reserves are high. By contrast, the current recourse to the marginal lending facility has no impact on the ECB's allotments.
With regard to banks' bidding, both liquidity measures are plausibly signed but far from being significant. Apparently, these results question the relevance of the tight liquidity hypothesis. By contrast, the estimated coefficients for the term spread (m − r) are highly significant in both specifications. Moreover, when using the alternative liquidity measures instead of (i − r), the evidence in favor of an additional time trend in the bids becomes even stronger. Thus, while the evidence for the tight liquidity hypothesis is weakened when alternative liquidity measures are employed, the rate-hike and the rationing hypotheses are still strongly supported by the data.
Conclusions
The literature on the bidder behavior in the repo auctions of the ECB offers three different theories that try to explain why banks overbid in fixed rate tenders. First, according to the 'rate hike hypothesis' advanced by the ECB, overbidding is due entirely to expectations of banks that the repo rate may increase during the reserve maintenance period. Since reserves obtained during the maintenance period are perfect substitutes, it obviously pays to increase one's demand just before the expected interest rate hike. Second, the 'tight liquidity' hypothesis claims that the ECB kept liquidity too tight such that the spread between the interbank rate and the repo rate exceeds its natural level. Banks therefore overbid in order to profit by arbitrage from this interest rate differential. Third, the 'rationing hypothesis' predicts that banks overbid in fixed rate tenders even if interest rates are expected to be constant and the spread is on average on its natural level.
In a recent announcement, the ECB (2003) explains a plan to reorganize its operational framework of monetary policy. In line with the rate hike hypothesis, all these measures are designed to stop the under-and overbidding problem by mitigating the role of rate expectations on banks' bidding. In particular, rate changes will not occur anymore during a maintenance period.
If the rate hike hypothesis could fully account for the observed overbidding, this plan should work. However, using data from the Bundesbank and the ECB, we find that bids submitted in fixed rate tenders increase exponentially even if one controls for rate expectations, the liquidity position of the money market, and the allotment policy of the central bank. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the ECB's new measures to improve the efficiency of the operational framework would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.
